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STUDENT NOTES
ALLEGING THE DATE OF THE OFFENSE IN THE INDICTMENT.-At
common law it was necessary to allege, in the indictment, the time
the offense was committed but there was no need to prove it as laid

unless some specific reason rendered time important."

In West

Virginia this requirement has been modified by statute, 2 the pertinent part of which is: "No indictment or other accusation shall
be quashed or deemed invalid ...
for omitting to state, or stating

improperly, the time at which the offense was committed, when
time is not of the essence of the offense. . . ." Applying a literal

construction to the statute, in all crimes, except in those instances
where time is of the essence, not only is an imperfect allegation
of time unimportant but such allegation may be omitted entirely.
Since its passage, there have been many cases decided under this
statute. Unfortunately the results of some cases are inconsistent
with such an interpretation and, in a few instances, with each other.
' State v. Bruce, 26 V. Va. 153, 157 (1885).
2 W. VA. CoDE c. 62, art. 2, § 10 (Michie, 1949).
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The major problem involved in felonies is the effect of alleging
the commission of the offense on a date subsequent to the finding
of the indictment. In State v. Runyon 3 the court held that this
defect was not cured by our statute and that the indictment was
fatally defective. It must appear from the indictment that the
offense was commited prior to its finding. 4 However, the court
held an indictment, found on March 10, 1953, valid where it
alleged the felony to have been committed on the "
day of
-1953".5
Obviously there is no showing from the indictment that the offense was committed prior to its finding. The
court has established an even more liberal rule by holding an
indictment for a felony valid where the date of the crime was not
fixed., These last two cases would seem to be more in conformity
with the spirit of the statute.
In misdemeanors there are two major problems. Is it necessary
for the indictment to show that the offense was committed (1)
prior to its finding and (2) within the prescribed statutory period?
The rule of the cases, in regard to the second problem, may be
summarized as follows. It must appear from the indictment, either
by alleging a specific date on which the offense was committed or by
general allegation, that the commission of the offense was within
one year next preceding the finding of the indictment (three years
for petit larceny or perjury7 ). This rule seems to have its origin
in State v. Bruce,8 where the court, after reciting the West Virginia
statute and common law rule, said ". . . it is not now essential to

aver the time of the offense in an indictment unless time is of the
essence of the offense. In misdemeanors it is essential that it
should appear from the indictment that the offense was not barred
by the statute of limitations at the time the indictment was found;
for, otherwise it would not show that the offense was a subsisting
and therefore indictable offense." A misstatement or an omission
of the time at which the crime was committed is immaterial except
in those cases where time is of the essence or where there is a
statutory bar to the offense. It is important here to note that such
language excludes the broad field of misdemeanors from the curative effect of this statute. There are many other cases reaching
similar results. It must appear, from the indictment for selling
3 100 W. Va. 647, 131 S.E. 466 (1926).
4

State v. McMillion, 104 W. Va. 1, 138 S.E. 732 (1927).

5 State v. Lewis, 77 S.E.2d 606 (W. Va. 1953).

6 State v. Parsons, 108 W. Va. 705, 152 S.E. 745 (1930).
7W. VA. CoDE c. 61, art. 11, § 9 (Michie, 1949).
8 26 W. Va. at 157.
9 State v. Pennington, 41 W. Va. 499, 28 S.E. 918 (1896).
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liquor without a license, that the offense was not barred by the
statute of limitations. 10 An indictment for assault is bad unless
it shows that the offense was not barred by statute," but this requirement is met by an allegation that the offense charged was
committed within one year next preceding the finding of the indictment. 2 Even though the indictment does specify a date on
which the offense was committed, there is no need to prove the
13
date as alleged.
It was strongly inferred in one case 14 and directly stated in
another' 5 that time is of the essence of a misdemeanor. It would
seem permissible to presume that such reasoning has greatly influenced the court in narrowly construing this statute. However,
as was pointed out in a concurring opinion in the case last cited, a
statute of limitations more properly applies solely to the remedy
and is no part of the offense at all.
As noted above, the court held an indictment for a felony
defective where it alleged the commission of the offense on a date
subsequent to the date of its finding. A more liberal rule has been
adopted for misdemeanors. In State v. Rector,16 such a defect
appeared, but the court held the indictment valid since the mistaken date appeared to be the result of a clerical error. A more
desirable result would have been reached if the court had established a uniform rule in felonies and misdemeanors. 1 7 "Generally
an allegation of time in a warrant or an indictment charging a
misdemeanor is unnecessary, except to show that the offense is not
barred by the statute of limitations and that it was committed
prior to the issuance of the warrant or finding of the indictment." '
Here the court held sufficient an indictment which charged the
commission of the offense on "day of ----1944."
An incongruous result was reached in State v. Price,'9 and
State v. Rector.20 The crime charged in both cases was a misdemeanor. In the Price case the indictment stated the date of the
offense to be ". . . 1917, and within one year next preceding the
finding of this indictment ....
"
The indictment was found in
10 See note 1 supra.

"State v. Price, 90 W. Va. 365, 110 S.F. 819 (1922).

12State v. Farley, 76 W. Va. 471, 89 S.. 738 (1916).
'3 State v. Farrell, 22 W. Va. 759 (1883).
14 See note 11 supra.
"sState v. Rector, 130 W. Va. 316, 43 S.E.2d 821 (1947).
10 Ibid.
'751 W. VA. L.Q. 129 (1948).
18 State v. Crummitt, 129 W. Va. 366, 371, 40 S.E.2d 851, 855 (1946).
1' See note 11 supra.
20 See note 15 supra.
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April, 1920, and the evidence showed the offense to have been
committed in January, 1920. In holding the indictment bad, the
court said the question of fact is immaterial since it is necessary that
it show an offense not barred by the statute of limitations. In the
Rector case the indictment, found in April, 1946, alleged the commission of the offense in December, 1946, followed by a recital that
it was committed "within one year from (italics supplied) the finding of this indictment." In holding that the lower court did not
err in overruling a motion to quash the indictment, the court said
that the policy is to sustain indictments for misdemeanors where
it is directly alleged that the offense was committed within one
year previous to the finding thereof", and this direct allegation will
not be overcome by a mistaken date, where from all the circumstances, as here, such mistake appears to have been the result of a
clerical error." There appears to be no logical reason why the
same rule would not apply in the Price case. Of course, the Price
case alleges a date which would be barred by statute and the Rector
case states a date subsequent to the finding of the indictment, but
it is submitted that this provides no solid ground for distinction.
Especially is this true in light of the emphasis on the words used in
the recitals, that the offenses were committed within the statutory
period. The language in the Price case was "next preceding the
finding," whereas in the Rector case the allegation was "from the
finding". The word "from" could be given prospective as well as
retrospective connotations. If "from" will cure a defective allegation of time, it seems that "next preceding" should.
W. T. S.

JOINDER OF CRIMES IN Tm SAME INDICTMENT.-While the joining of crimes in the same indictment may be regulated by statute,1
the practice was familiar at common law. 2 Crimes of the same
general character, subject to like punishment and arising from
the same transaction could be joined. Trial of like crimes was
1See, for example, W. VA. CODE c. 61, art. 3, § 12; c. 62, art. 2, §§ 5, 24, art.
3, § 19 and art. 9 § 9 (Michie, 1949). Statutes in other jurisdictions allowing
a joinder of offenses have been sustained. Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S.
396 (1894); Williams v. United States, 168 U.S. 382, 390 (1897); People v.
Kelly, 203 Cal. 128, 263 Pac.. 226 (1928); Commonwealth v. Slavski, 245 Mass.
405, 140 N.E. 465 (1923).
2 Queen v. Castro, 5 Q.B.D. 490 (1880). No joinder was strictly illegal since
the pendency of one accusation could not be pleaded in bar or abatement of
another charge. Thus, the court had discretion in ruling on a motion to
quash for a misjoinder of offenses. 1 BISHOP, Nmv CRIMINAL PROCEDiURE § 424
(2d ed. 1913).
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